

# Deliberation and Voting: A Matter of Truth or A Matter of Taste<sup>§</sup>

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## **Abstract**

We study the effect of strategic communication on voting when voters have partially conflicting interests. Voters may or may not have common interests depending on the true state. That is, not only the *truth* but also the *taste* is an issue. This paper shows that truthful communication regarding the state is inconsistent with equilibrium behavior for any voting rule if the size of the electorate is large enough. Thus, we show that it is impossible for large elections to simultaneously identify correct alternatives and alternatives preferred by the majority via truthful communication when voters have partially conflicting interests.

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